State of Florida
Office of Attorney General Ashley Moody

SLIP OPINION



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AG number: 12003Style: Young v. Department of Education
Jurisdiction: 1st DCADate issued: December 1, 2006
Original file, if available:12003.wpd

AG HEADNOTE


Denial of state assistance
A massage therapist who appealed after he was denied additional state assistance failed to identify any specific errors in the state agency ruling that refused the aid, and therefore he is not entitled to having the decision reversed, the 1st DCA said.
David Young received assistance from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation to become a licensed massage therapist, but was denied when he sought additional assistance in establishing his massage business. The division concluded that Young was not eligible for the services he requested. After a hearing, an administrative law judge issued a recommended order concluding that Young was not eligible for the services, and the Department of Education adopted the judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Young appealed, but the DCA said he failed to prove any basis for overturning the decision against him.
“Young does not specifically identify an erroneous conclusion of law or a finding of fact which is not supported by the record. As suggested by the standard of review, it is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to evaluate and weigh the testimony and other evidence submitted at the hearing to resolve factual conflicts, and to arrive at findings of fact. It is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence anew,” the DCA said.




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

DAVID A. YOUNG, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

v. CASE NO. 1D06-0219

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
DIVISION OF VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION,

Appellee.
____________________________/

Opinion filed December 1, 2006.

An appeal from an order of the Department of Education.

David A. Young, pro se, Appellant.

Daniel Woodring, General Counsel, and Matthew J. Carson, Department of Education, Tallahassee, for Appellee.


PER CURIAM.

David A. Young appeals a final order of the Department of Education (Department) adopting in full a recommended order ruling that Young was not eligible for certain services he requested from the Department’s Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. We affirm.
Young received assistance from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation previously and, with that assistance, became a licensed massage therapist. Young sought additional assistance in establishing his massage business, but such additional services were refused by the Department on the ground that he was not eligible for the requested services. Young sought a hearing on the denial of these services.
The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the administrative law judge received evidence and argument from Young as well as the Department regarding the prior provision of vocational rehabilitation services to Young and his eligibility for other services. The judge thereafter entered a recommended order making detailed findings of fact and determining that Young was not eligible for the services he was seeking. The Department adopted in full the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the recommended order.
Our standard of review of the Department’s final order is governed by section 120.68, Florida Statutes (2005). A reviewing court may set aside agency action when it finds that the action is dependent on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, a material error in procedure, an erroneous interpretation of law, or an abuse of discretion. 120.68(7), Fla. Stat. (2005); see Gross v. Dep’t of Health, 819 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
Young does not specifically identify an erroneous conclusion of law or a finding of fact which is not supported by the record. As suggested by the standard of review, it is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to evaluate and weigh the testimony and other evidence submitted at the hearing to resolve factual conflicts, and to arrive at findings of fact. It is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence anew. See Smith v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 681 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Our review of the record indicates that the findings of fact are supported by competent and substantial evidence. Further, we hold that the judge’s conclusions of law are not erroneous. Accordingly, the final order is AFFIRMED.
WEBSTER, BENTON, AND VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
 
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